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According to the World Bank and United Nations indicators, Malawi is one of the poorest countries in Africa. 
During the one party autocratic rule of Dr Banda from 1964 to 1993, the government encouraged people to work 
on their farms; hence the informal sector was largely suppressed. When the multiparty system of governance was 
introduced in 1994, a new government led by a business tycoon Bakili Muluzi of UDF introduced business loans to 
assist  Malawians  set  up  informal  businesses.  Consequently,  the  informal  sector  –  mainly  street  vending- 
mushroomed in all the urban centers of Malawi. The president himself said that he was patron of the street 
vendors. When another president Dr Bingu wa Mutharika, an economist, took over the government in 2004, he 
insisted that all vendors must be removed from the streets. In April 2006, he mobilized the police and the army 
through what was termed operation dongosolo (Dongosolo is a chichewa word which means ‘order’) to remove all 
vendors from the streets. This was effectively implemented despite serious threat of opposition from vendors. The 
informal sector that had been a source of livelihood for most unemployed Malawians was wiped out within a matter 
of days. Using a qualitative approach, the study aims at analyzing the political transition in the country and its 
consequences on street vending- especially in the city of Zomba. The findings show that political transitions have 
had a positive and negative impact on street vending in the country. 
Keywords: Malawi, Street vending, Informal sector 
1.  Introduction 
Based on a ten year research on street vending, Cross (2000) concludes “street vending should, by all 
logical criteria, eventually disappear”; despite this logical criteria Cross adds “what we found, however, 
is  that  street  vending,  despite  some  problems  and  frequent  attacks,  is  a  thriving  and  growing 
phenomenon”. Interestingly, in the analysis of urban street vending in Malawi, Jimu (2006) agrees with 
Cross’s conclusion when he asks the question “can the resilience of street vendors to urban authorities 
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against marginalisation and underdevelopment of their livelihood strategies?” (emphasis added).  This is 
a very good question but in relation to recent developments in the informal sector of Malawi, it is largely 
outdated. Currently, there is nothing like “resilience” of the street vendor because since 19th April 2006, 
all  street  vendors  in  urban  centres  were  effectively  removed  from  their  ‘business  premises’  and 
relocated to the newly built flea markets. Probably the second part of Jimu’s question is more relevant; 
that is to say: Is this relocation a sign of the vendor’s “powerlessness against marginalisation and 
underdevelopment of their livelihood strategies?”. This is a question worthy pursuing so as to help 
answer the mystery surrounding the present government’s ‘success’ to relocate the vendors after the 
past  successive  governments  had  failed.  This  relocation  also  puts  into  question  Cross’s  decade 
observation  that  despite  attacks  from  authorities,  street  vending  “is  a  thriving  and  growing 
phenomenon”. Even with the apparent demise of street vending in Malawi, people could not fully accept 
that it had indeed happened.  The forced relocation of street vendors in Malawi, though not entirely 
unique in contemporary Africa, has had a significant impact on the informal sector activities as well as 
livelihood of many other Malawians who depended on it for their every day survival. An analysis of the 
impact of this relocation exercise, especially on livelihood of the vendors is also an aspect of interest in 
this paper. 
The paper mainly focuses on the city of Zomba in Malawi. Located in the southern region of Malawi, 
Zomba is the former capital city of the country. Despite the fact that it is one of the highly urbanized 
areas of Malawi, amongst the few studies that have ever been conducted relating to street vending, 
almost none focused on the city itself. The paper relies on empirical and secondary data. Empirical data 
was obtained from interviews with the former street vendors (currently operating in Zomba’s flea market-
also known as the Vendor’s Market and Matawale market); former executive members of the Zomba 
Street Vendors Association; local municipal assembly authorities; and finally some members of the 
general public within Zomba. Secondary data was obtained from newspapers (especially the country’s 
popular Nation newspaper), government documents as well as a general review of the literature on 
street vending. 
Taking into consideration that “street vending is possibly the most visible and significant aspect and 
manifestation”  (Jimu,  2006)  of  the  urban  informal  sector,  the  paper  starts  by  giving  a  theoretical 
framework of the informal sector itself. The paper explores the relevance of the informal sector to 
contemporary third world economies. The paper then proceeds to discuss the peculiar features of street 
vending as compared to the informal sector in general. Lastly, the paper discusses in greater detail the 
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2. The Informal Sector: A Problem or Solution to Third Word Economies? 
There are various definitions describing the informal sector however, it is not the purpose of this paper 
to fully discuss or evaluate these various definitions1. What is significant in the conceptualization of the 
term “informal sector” is that since its first usage by ILO in the Kenya and Ghana study of 1970s, it has 
been  changing.  Initially,  the  informal  sector  was regarded  as  distinctively  different  form  the  formal 
sector. Recently however the new understanding of the term “emphasize the existence of   informal 
employment in both the formal and informal economy” (Richards et al 2006). Cross’s (1999) definition of 
the  inform  sector  (that  encompasses  street  vending)  is  well  articulated  and  encompassing  hence 
adopted by this paper. Cross describes the informal sector as "the production and exchange of legal 
goods and services that involves the lack of appropriate business permits, violation of zoning codes, 
failure  to  report  tax  liability,  non-compliance  with  labor  regulations  governing  contracts  and  work 
conditions, and/or the lack of legal guarantees in relations with suppliers and clients."  
It is generally agreed that the informal sector in developing countries is rapidly growing especially after 
the ‘new wave’ of democratic dispensation in the early 1990s. Although this is regarded as a welcome 
move in some circles, other scholars have a contrary view; they pinpoint the fact that the informal sector 
is detrimental for the economic development of a country. Some of the arguments against the informal 
sector are raised by Kutcha-Helbling (2000) who powerfully argues that the growth of the informal sector 
“is an indication that something is wrong…a large informal sector has serious consequences for private 
sector activity, economic growth and development, and the consolidation of democracy”. The most 
significant part of Kutcha-Helbling’s argument is that he links the problem of the informal sector to 
higher levels of “consolidation of democracy” and not only the economic sphere as most scholars do. 
Kutcha-Helbling (2000) raises eleven arguments that are summarized below in Table 1. 
Despite the above arguments against the informal sector and the negative attributes it is associated 
with2, there is growing evidence that the informal sector plays a critical role in the development of a 
nation. Madziakapita (2003) argues, “there is clear evidence that the benefits of the informal sector in 
many countries can no longer be ignored.” 
                                                               
1 According to Farrell, Roman and Fleming (in Kutcha-Helbling 2000:4) There are two approaches in defining the informal sector and these are 
definitional and the behavioral approaches. In this regard, the definitional approach refers to the informal sector as an “economic activity 
unrecorded in official statistics such as the gross national product (GNP)”. On the other hand, the behavioral approach “is based on whether or 
not activity complies with the established judicial, regulatory, and institutional framework”.  
2 There are several negative terms used to describe the informal sector such as: “shadow, unofficial, third, underground, gray, hidden, counter, 
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Those against the informal sector overlook the fact that there is a strong relationship between the formal 
and informal sector. Contrary from the view that the formal and informal sectors are in competition, both 
sectors benefit from each other in a number of ways. Cross (2000) clarifies this argument when he 
mentions “many formal products are available in poorer areas, but only because they are provided by 
informal stores and stalls”. Arguably, he adds that: the popularity of Coca Cola, Pepsi and innumerable 
other snack and consumer products is made possible in  Third World countries by the small-scale 
distribution channels of these products that makes ample use of informal and semiformal distributors 
and retails outlets that reduce the final cost to the consumer in poor areas. 
TABLE I : PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE FORMAL SECTOR 
Problems created by the informal sector  How the problems are created 
1  Undemocratic  Decision-making  and 
misguided Policies 
The informal sector does not have property rights and 
this  empowers  the  elite  who  have  property  and  also 
influence policy making 
2  Distorts  Resource  Allocation  and  Lowers 
Productivity 
Inefficient  use  of  resources  is  inevitable  due  to  non-
official engagement of the informal sector. 
3  Erodes Competitiveness  The  formal  sector  shoulders  the  tax  burden  hence 
become uncompetitive when compared to the informal 
sector that doesn’t pay taxes. 
4  Lack  of  access  to  and  higher  costs  for 
essential public services 
Due to the illegality of the informal sector, it is denied 
the  opportunity  to  connect  the  water,  electricity  and 
phone services 
5  Less government revenue for public services  The formal sector is tempted to become informal so as 
avoid  the  taxes  and  this  leads  to  less  government 
revenue.  
6  Lack of information and lack of transparency 
invite corruption 
Not able to enjoy certain services and information due 
to its illegality, the informal sector may resort to corrupt 
practices.  
7  Weakens the credibility of political institutions 
and democracy 
The mere existence of the illegal informal sector may be 
interpreted as failure of the political institutions of the 
government 
8  Wastes Resources and hinders growth   The informal sector’s assets are not rationally invested 
due  to  “lack  of  sound,  accessible,  legally  protected 
property”. 
9  Increases  and  reinforces  poverty  and 
inequality 
Workers  in  the  informal  sector  earn  low  incomes 
because  of  ill-designed  institutions  and  this  leads  to 




Weaken  trade  union  power  and  erodes 
workers’ benefits 
Employers hire fewer workers formally and hire more 




Inaccurate  contributions  to  international  and 
regional organisations 
Distorted decision making for international and regional 
bodies  due  to  inaccurate  data  being  used  (informal 
sector is left out in the data). 
Authors’ summary based on arguments raised by Kutcha-Helbling (2000) 
 
Madziakapita (2003) further argues that the informal sector helps to absorb labour of the new arrivals in 
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can emerge hence destabilize the whole society  in general. As opposed to  the formal sector, the 
informal sector capably creates a large number of jobs at a very low capital cost because it doesn’t 
factor  in  ‘extra’  costs  such  as  employment  benefits.  More  specifically  the  informal  sector  provides 
“employment consistency in a discriminatory labor market, and a social life”(Morales, 2000). 
Bugnicourt (1995) makes an interesting observation when he states that the informal sector as opposed 
to the formal sector sometimes has the willingness to sell at a loss so that in the long run it can benefit 
by winning the customer’s loyalty. Similarly, the informal sector can sell at a loss in order to deal with an 
immediate cash flow problem. In both cases the poor are greatly assisted. 
 More importantly, Richardson (1984) mentions that the informal sector works like the training ground for 
skills and entrepreneurship development. In the long run psychologically, the informal sector gives the 
poor people an opportunity to understand and later prove that they are worthy something and that they 
can effectively take action to sustain themselves and their families (Bugnicourt, 1995). 
The informal sector also acts like an import saving for the nation because in most cases (but not 
always), it relies on local materials and recycled (or second-hand) capital goods (Richardson, 1984). 
Cross (2000) argues, “the paradox is that, despite these problems, the informal sector is now often 
called upon by today’s development experts to take over where the formal sector has failed”. He states 
that the formal sector has in many ways failed to eradicate unemployment hence the government and 
NGOs are currently busy providing loans to these institutions so that they develop. According to him, 
this is a clear indication that the informal sector is recognized as critical for national development. Cross 
(2000) further argues that scholars tend to focus mainly on what the informal sector lacks as compared 
to  the  formal  sector  but  they  “overlook  are  the  features  that  actually  make  the  informal  sector 
successful—the spirit of survival and flexibility”.  
3. Peculiar Features of Street Vending In The Informal Sector 
Although street vending  is not really different from the  informal sector in general,  there are some 
noticeable elements that make it unique. However it should be pointed out that some informal sector 
activities  might  share  the  street  vending  characteristics-  though  to  a  lesser  extent.  These  peculiar 
features of street vending are: 
Firstly, street vending is more that a commercial activity but a lifestyle. Cross (2000) refers to his own 
research that “vendors have many times claimed that street vending is also a life style choice, allowing 
them greater personal freedom and flexibility”. In other words, street vending provides “a social life” 
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because they want to ‘feel’ the city life while earning a living at the same time. Similarly, Mitullah (2003) 
argues that: 
Although it has been argued that vending attracts those who have limited opportunities…street vending 
is  increasingly  becoming  an  option  for  many  citizens.  It  is  no  longer  limited  to  the  lower  social 
groups…A number of entrepreneurs have entered the trade as an option. 
Morales  (2000)  further  raises  thought  provoking  arguments  related  to  the  issue  of  treating  street 
vending as a lifestyle. He argues:  
Vendors are individuals, but vending is an outcome of the choices of many people, each one a part of a 
variety of social relationships…an activity whose benefits and costs cannot be reduced to a single 
metric and should be understood over time and, analytically speaking, from the perspective of the 
studied not of the analyst. 
Secondly, by taking over the public space, street vending has an advantage in the sense that this 
“minimizes overhead costs of rent and utilities, and is thus ideally suited for informal growth.” (Cross, 
2000). Similarly, it provides suitable services to the public so that they do not have to go to shops 
(Bugnicourt, 1995). 
Thirdly, although referring to the informal sector in general, Cross’s (2000) observation of “the spirit of 
survival and flexibility” is probably more applicable to street vending as compared to other informal 
sector activities. Xaba et al (2002) also refers to this scenario as “‘survivalist’ activities”. These terms 
imply a very high level of commitment towards goal attainment amongst street vendors. Everyday, new 
ways of survival have to be discovered whenever threats to their activities are looming. In relation to 
flexibility, street vending provides the opportunity to sell commodities in small quantities for those who 
can’t afford large quantities (Bugnicourt, 1995). For example street vendors may buy a packet of salt 
from a shop and then re-pack the same in small quantities so as to assist the poor who cant afford a 
large pack. 
Despite these peculiar features of street vending authorities regard it as an ‘eye sore’ which needs to be 
removed. The reasons why street vendors resist relocation are neither well understood nor appreciated 
by the authorities. Jimu (2005), raises three main reasons why street vendors resist relocation: (1) they 
want to have “direct access to actual and potential clients”; (2) their activity is in most cases their only or 
“major source of livelihood” which is strongly defended against any possible interruption; finally (3) “any 
effort by the municipal authorities to evict them is construed as contravention of their fundamental 
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4. Economic Situation In Malawi and The Size of The Informal Sector 
According to a series of World Bank and the UNDP’s Human Development Reports, Malawi is regarded 
as one of the poorest countries in the world. In fact poverty in Malawi is   perverse “widespread, deep 
and severe” (Malawi Government, 2002). According to the last Integrated Household Survey of 1998, 
65.3 % of the Malawian population is poor [poverty line calculated at livelihood dependent on $0.34 per 
day] (NSO, 1998).  This environment has also contributed to the growth of the informal sector. 
According to Mitullah (2003), in Africa, there hasn’t been enough research in the area of street vending. 
Consequently  “the  negligence  of  the  street  vending  activities  has  resulted  in  the  lack  of  accurate 
estimates of the numbers of street traders”. There is no agreement on “how to measure the informal 
sector and on its actual size” (Kutcha-Helbling, 2000). Different scholars have produced different results 
in relation to size of the informal sector. The major reason for these variations is the different techniques 
utilized in order to measure this sector. Based on some few studies, the size of the informal sector in 
Malawi can be determined. Richards et al (2006) notes that only 12 percent of the total workforce in 
Malawi is in the formal sector. This entails that the remaining larger percent of 88 is either in smallholder 
agriculture or the informal sector. More specifically, the World Bank in the 1999/2000 period estimated 
that the informal sector in Malawi contributed 40.3 percent to the country’s GNP (Richards et al 2006). 
Based on these figures it is not surprising that the informal sector in Malawi is as large as that of other 
developing countries in the region. 
5. Street Vending In Malawi 
Street vending in Malawi has been going for a long time- even way back during the colonial days. 
During the one-party autocratic rule of Dr Kamuzu Banda, street vending as well as other informal 
activities were seriously suppressed or frowned upon.  Dr Banda created what was known as the 
Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP) to encourage the unemployed youth to work in the fields or take up 
vocational training activities. Although in later years the MYP became well known as paramilitary wing of 
the ruling Malawi Congress Party (MCP) it played a critical role in reducing unemployment in the country 
(Phiri, 2000). Commenting on the role of the MYP during a political rally held in April 1975, Dr Banda 
mentioned that (in Phiri, 2000):  
I organised the Young Pioneers so that the youth would make useful citizens of the country. I did not 
want our youth to roam the streets of Zomba, Blantyre, and Lilongwe, loafing with their hands in their 
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they just sat and ate, doing nothing. No, they had to be taught first and foremost, discipline and respect 
for their elders; then respect for manual labour. 
However when the MCP led government was waning in authority, with calls for multiparty system of 
governance, the MYP was disbanded in 1993 through a Malawi Army operation known as Operation 
Bwezani.    In  1994,  the  constitution  was  amended  to  allow  for  multiparty  elections.  The  United 
Democratic Front led by Bakili Muluzi took over government. Unlike Dr Banda, Muluzi encouraged the 
informal market, he even stated that he was ‘Minister of Vendors’ or ‘patron of the vendors’.  This 
doesn’t  imply  that  street  vending  was  initiated  by  the  democratic  transition.  However,  democracy 
enhanced the street vending activities in Malawi thus, “any attempt to associate the origins of extralegal 
activities [referring to street vending] to democracy is not only wrong but misleading”3.  Muluzi, facilitated 
the  Creation  of  Small  and  Medium  Enterprise  Fund  (SMEF)  which  the  Reserve  Bank  of  Malawi 
coordinated. This was meant to be a revolving fund. Coming from a business background, Muluzi in his 
political rallies encouraged Malawians to be involved in small business ventures. Organisation such as 
Small Enterprise Development Organisation of Malawi (SEDOM), Women’s World Banking (WWB), 
National Association of Business Women (NABW) and several others implemented the SMEF. Muluzi 
even commended the street vendors in his National Assembly speech of June 2002 when he said “I am 
proud to say that those who are doing small-scale business as vendors or hawkers are prospering in 
our liberalised economy” (Nation quoted in Richards et al 2006). Apart from the availability of funds and 
relaxation of regulations, the growth of street vending and the informal sector in general is attributed to 
several other factors such as unemployment due to privatization, retrenchment in the public sector and 
many  other  related  factors.  These  have  been  adequately  discussed  in  the  works  of  Jimu  (2005), 
Madziakapita (2003) and Richards et al (2006).  
In Malawi as in most other African countries, street vendors trade in a number of commodities operating 
from different locations of  the urban areas. Some of  the  commodities  they trade in are  fruits and 
vegetables, cooked food, toys, electrical appliances, second hand clothes and shoes, bicycle parts and 
many other related commodities. They also provide a number of services such as barbering, shoe 
polishing, photography, hairdressing, commercial pay phone services, repair works of shoes and watch 
etc. During the second term of Muluzi’s rule, he made efforts to ‘formalize’ street vending. In this regard, 
he sought funds from Malawi’s largest conglomerate, Press Holdings Limited (managed through Press 
Trust) to build the flea markets or popularly called the ‘Vendor’s Markets’. Muluzi mentioned that as 
‘patron’ of the vendors, he felt vendors needed to be protected from the hot sun and rains so that they 
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can comfortably ply their trade. The understanding was not necessarily that they were going to be 
forced to move from the streets once these markets were constructed. 
The trust in 2002 provided K123 million (about $12m) to Blantyre and Lilongwe City Assemblies and 
Zomba (then it was a Municipality) to build flea markets so as to help bring about cleanliness and 
reduce congestion on the streets. Press Trust referred to these projects in their 2002 and 2003 reports, 
as “the biggest project the Trust has ever undertaken” in the urban areas of Malawi. 
When the markets were completed, the vendors refused to relocate. They, amongst other reasons, 
mentioned that the markets are not well designed and too small to accommodate all the vendors. 
Despite a lot of pressure from the local assemblies, nothing was done.  When the new President Bingu 
wa Mutharika took over the government in 2004, there were indications that things were bound to 
change. Bingu resigned from the ruling UDF party that ushered him into government and set up his own 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Although the new president set up a programme to provide loans 
to the informal sector traders, he started implementing certain policies that the former president had 
overlooked such as relocation of the vendors. Despite overwhelming opposition from the street vendors, 
Bingu  forced  the  vendors  to  occupy  the  flea  markets  after  mobilizing  heavily  armed  police  in  an 
operation code named dongosolo (chichewa word which means ‘order’). Bingu threatened that he was 
going to use the army if the vendors resisted the armed police.  
6.  Operation  Dongosolo  and  Marginalisation  of  The  Vendors:  Why  The  Operation 
‘Succeeded’ 
Although Cross (2000) argues that street vending always survives “to the extent that it can withstand 
hostile  attempts  to  over-regulate  or  eliminate  it,  either  through  evasion,  negotiation,  or  conflict”, 
operation dongosolo in Malawi has demonstrated a different outcome from Cross’s observation. Some 
of the reasons for the ‘success’ of operation dongosolo can be attributed to: 
Pressure from the Press Trust/ the Donor 
In  January  2006  the  Press  Trust  started  exerting  pressure  on  the  government  to  ensure  that  the 
vendors are relocated to these newly constructed flea markets. The Press Trust’s Executive Secretary 
Clement  Chilungulo  complained  to  the  government  indicating  that  it  “was  disappointed  that  after 
spending over K123 million (about $12m) to build flea markets for vendors, the structures have instead 
been turned into white elephants because the vendors continue to refuse to occupy them”.
4 The trust 
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further threatened to suspend construction of a flea market in Mzuzu and additional ones in Lilongwe 
and Blantyre cities. Chilungulo added, “It’s disappointing from our perspective. Having spent so much 
money we see the structures not being used. Any donor would feel sad and disappointed.”  The trust 
indirectly blamed the government by attributing the failure  “to a relative failure in social mobilisation and 
an absence of the necessary legal framework”. Taking into consideration that the trust is one of the 
major donor of development activities in the country the  government had to react- and it did with 
swiftness. The vendors were registered before being allocated space in the flea market. 
Absence of the local political representatives (councillors) 
There are different types of local assemblies in Malawi: the city, town and district assemblies. There are 
four city assemblies (Blantyre, Zomba, Mzuzu and Lilongwe),  and several district and town assemblies. 
Local assemblies in Malawi are composed of: 
1.  One member elected from each ward within the local government area (councillors); 
2.  Traditional Authorities and Sub-Traditional Authorities from the local government area as non-
voting members; 
3.  Members of Parliament from the constituencies that fall within the local government area as 
non-voting members; 
4.  Five persons as non-voting members to be appointed by the elected members to cater for the 
interests of such special interest groups as the Assembly may determine (GoM, 1998). 
Each assembly is headed by a chairman, who serves a five-year term and is elected by members of the 
assembly on their first meeting. In the case of a city or municipal assembly, the chairman is known as 
the mayor. Each local authority area is divided into wards and represented by a democratically elected 
councillor, who remains in office for a four-year term. As the only voting member of the assembly, the 
councillor is the most important individual in an assembly. The first local assembly polls were conducted 
on 21st November 2000. However, the term of the councillors was over in 2005 and the government has 
not yet organized fresh elections. One of the reasons given for failure to organize the elections is lack of 
funds. This has somehow negatively affected the street vendors. Most councillors knew that they were 
brought into office through mostly the support of the vendors themselves. In this regard, the vendors 
had to some extent an authoritative voice through the councillors. 
In spite of the fully entrenched democratic and legal framework, the street vendors in Malawi lost one of 
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experiencing as depicted by Kwasi Adu-Amankwah, Deputy Secretary- General of Ghana Trades Union 
Congress.
5His observation on the informal sector in Ghana aptly captures the scenario of street vendors 
in Malawi where there are no councillors to represent their views at local assemblies. Kwasi Adu-
Amankwah observes that: 
Regardless of their numerical strength, in relation to the entire workforce, [the informal sector] lack 
representation in the policy process and have no presence in the corridors of decision-making and 
power. They have neither the facilities nor the possibilities to influence the conditions and decisions that 
affect them in any systematic manner; nor do they have any access to the services they need to operate 
effectively and efficiently. 
Lack of support from the ruling party 
Interestingly,  Mutharika  started  to  introduce  harsh  policies  against  the  vendors  when  he  had  just 
unceremoniously ended his link with the UDF, the party that had sponsored his presidency in the May 
20, 2004 general elections. 
During the 1999 election campaign, the UDF heavily used the vendors’ grievances as a campaign tool. 
At that time, the UDF officials accused then MCP president, Gwanda Chakuamba, of scheming to 
oppress the street vendors when it was alleged Chakuamba “would kick vendors out of the streets to 
restore order and the beauty of Malawian cities like Blantyre”6. In this scenario many people doubted 
whether the UDF government would ever evict vendors “as they were regarded untouchables”7. This 
made most vendors to defy the local authorities to the extent that some vendors even mentioned that 
they were ready to die in the street rather than experience the eviction. No wonder “no one could 
question their defiance”8. Nevertheless, the vendors overlooked the fact that the political environment 
had changed. Bingu wa Mutharika knew that most vendors were supporters of the UDF but he had 
resigned from that party hence free to implement any policy that was against the vendors’ interests.  
Extreme use of force 
When the eviction of street vendors was looming in April 2006, the chairman of the Vendors Association 
(Lilongwe branch) Potifala Thembakako who was accompanied by other chairpersons from Blantyre, 
Limbe  and  Zomba  presented  a  petition  to  Members  of  Parliament  pleading  for  their  intervention. 
According to their representatives, the vendors were worried that the government had threatened to use 
                                                               
5 Undated, accessed at www.streetnet.org.za/english/ghana.htm  
6 Sabola Taonga, “Vendors eviction: Who benefits?” Nation, 27 April 2006 
7ibid 
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the Army and Police to force them out of the streets. Mr Thembakako said “I can’t understand why they 
want to use guns on a matter all of us can resolve amicably.”9  A few days before the date of eviction 
Limbe street vendors converged for prayers at Kamuzu Upper Stadium. The vendors wanted to pray so 
that God should intervene on their behalf. However the Police intervened instead so as to disrupt the 
meeting claiming that it was not approved. A chaotic scene erupted when a group of Police officers 
threw tear-gas into the praying crowds. Many were also arrested at the same venue. The government 
spokesperson, Patricia Kaliati responded, “we had have enough sympathy with them. We gave them 
loans, rehabilitated...flea markets and if anything they should have occupied the markets first and raised 
their grievances later”10 
7. Impact of Operation Dongosolo  
The various interviews conducted with the vendors, local authorities and other individuals indicated that 
most former street vendors had either gone back to the rural areas to farm as subsistence farmers or 
are now occupying the newly built vendors’ market. There were mixed reactions from the general public 
concerning this eviction of the vendors-some commended the government while others disagreed with 
the move. The views of those who supported the government’s move are aptly summarized in one of 
the comments expressed in the Nation newspaper of 18th April 2006: 
That is why I want to say thumbs up to government for a job well done on the vendors. The fact that 
they  have  been  in  the  streets  for  the  past  12  years  does  not  make  their  business  legal….  The 
bottomline is that no one is above the law… Let cleanness and beauty return to our cities. Let people 
move in the streets with peace of mind11 
Others felt that despite the problems of congestion and hygiene the vendors used to sell commodities at 
reasonable prices that benefited the majority, especially the poor. Below is an analysis of the impact of 
operation dongosolo: 
Loss of revenue for the assembly 
According  to  the  municipal  assembly  officials,  they  are  now  getting  less  and  less  revenue  when 
compared to the period soon after relocation. Before the vendors were brought into the market revenue 
collection was very low (amongst the vendors they could only collect K400.00 per day) as most of them 
refused to pay. The vendors used to argue that the city was not providing any service to them. Soon 
                                                               
9 “Govt puts foot down on vendors”, Nation, 18 April 2006. 
10 ibid 
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after April 2006, when they were realocated, almost all the vendors were paying the daily fee of K20.00. 
It was easy to collect the fee because they were all in the market. However since April 2006, the total 
revenue has been decreasing because most of the vendors are abandoning their businesses. Most of 
them claim that they are not generating enough profits as they used to do in the past and this is 
affecting the local assembly revenue. According to one municipal official, some of the vendors have 
gone back to their respective villages where they are involved in small-scale farming. Vending has no 
longer become viable for their survival. In April 2006, the flea market used to generate approximately 
K6,000.00 per day but now the revenue has gone so low as K3,500.00 per day. According to the Flea 
Market Master, another problem that has emerged is that some of the vendors refuse to pay the daily 
fee of K20.00 because they argue “we were forced to come here- with guns on our heads. We did not 
want this place in the first place. Why should I pay? You only pay for something that you are interested 
in, not a forced service.”  
Another reason why the vendors refuse to pay the daily fee is that they are not allowed free access to 
the toilets in the market. They pay K5.00 in order to relieve themselves; for a bath the fee is K20.00. 
The local authority officer however mentioned that initially the facilities were free but it was discovered 
that some items such taps were being vandalized hence the local assembly decided to outsource the 
facility to a private service provider who charges the users. According to the local assembly officer, the 
facility has been operating without any problem soon after the private operator took over. The vendors 
complain  that  the  profits  generated  from  their  business  is  already  low  and  they  don’t  have  to  be 
overburdened with extra costs- just because they want to answer the call of nature; “isn’t the K20.00 
everyday fee we pay not enough to carter for all the other needs?”, they enquired. 
Loss of revenue for the vendors and some shop owners 
All the vendors interviewed mentioned that they have noticed a major reduction in the profits generated 
from their businesses. They mentioned that the success in their business is highly dependent on the 
unplanned decision-making of their customers. Customers decide to buy their items not because they 
had initially planned to do so, however the moment they see the items they are enticed to buy. The 
relocation, away from the general public, entails that their prospective customers are neither able to see 
nor get enticed to buy the items. People who plan beforehand to buy items end up doing so in shops 
and not the vendors. The case of Eunice Moyo, cited below, shows the extent of the problem created by 
this loss of profits/revenue: 
Eunice Moyo is a 40-year-old a widow living in Chikanda area of Zomba. She has five grown-up children 
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She had been a street vendor for close to six years. Mainly, she had been selling second-hand clothes. 
Before the forceful relocation she was selling close to the Zomba bus depot gate. On a good day she 
used to make K5, 000.00 or more per day as profit. She has managed to build a house in Chikanda 
where she is staying with the money realized from her business. She also could manage to send her 
children to private schools and feed the family. With the relocation, she has very few customers and 
now  can only  manage  to  realize  between  K 500.00  to  K1,  000.00  per  day.  She  emphasized  that 
sometimes she goes home without selling anything at all. Mrs Moyo added that “Ndimangoyamika 
Mulungu ngati anthu andigula tsikulimenelo” (I only thank God when someone manages to buy my 
items on that day). Moyo is now struggling to feed and pay fees for her children. She thanks God that 
she at least built her own house during the good business days.  
The study also revealed that before relocation, some vendors used to work together with the formally 
established  shop  owners-  especially  shop  owners  of  Asian  origin.  Some  vendors  used  to  get  the 
commodities on credit and at a reduced price from these shops. The vendors in turn sold the items to 
the public at a slightly higher price. After the items were sold, the vendors managed to repay the shop 
owners and kept the extra money realized. In some cases certain commodities that were close to the 
expiry period such as milk, batteries etc were sold to the vendors at a relatively very low price. In this 
case the poor consumers, vendors and the shop owners were benefiting in the process. Taking into 
consideration  that  loans  are  not  easily  accessible  amongst  the  poor  in  Malawi,  the  arrangement 
between the shop owners and the vendors themselves assisted the latter to fully operate without going 
through the trouble of raising capital. The removal of the vendors from the streets has disrupted this 
arrangement to the extent that both, the vendors and the shop owners are experiencing loss of revenue.   
Corruption amongst the law enforcers 
It was revealed during interviews that there are some vendors who manage to discreetly sell their items 
to customers along the streets without the knowledge of authorities. These vendors however sell small 
but relatively valuable items such as DVDs, CDs and vehicle   detergents. However when the police or 
other authorities find such vendors they are not automatically arrested. Several vendors explained that 
the  police,  who  are  supposed  to  ensure  that  no  one  is  plying  their  trade  along  the  streets,  are 
sometimes very corrupt. The police are given K500.00 or more and then they allow these illegal street 
vendors to continue selling their item discreetly. Those who illegally sell relatively non-valuable items 
such as mandasi (locally made cakes) or doughnuts are automatically arrested. The main reason is that 
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Tension amongst the vendors  
At Zomba Flea Market two antagonistic camps have emerged amongst the vendors. One camp belongs 
to those who have fully complied with the regulation to operate within the market. The second camp 
doesn’t want to fully comply to the regulations hence tend to find any excuse to break the municipal 
regulations. The latter group normally operates outside on the premises surrounding the flea market. 
According to the authorities, this group has finally been allowed to ply their trade outside the flea market 
(but not far from the flea market walls). The main reason given is that when the market was being 
opened, there were too many vendors against small limited space. Consequently some were allowed to 
operate outside but within the immediate vicinity of the flea market.  
However, this arrangement has created divisions amongst these vendors. Those operating inside the 
market  feel  that  the  authorities  are  deliberately  relaxing  the  regulations  so  as  to  appease  those 
operating outside. They argue that those outside are easily accessible to the customers hence are 
highly advantaged. This tension is bound to create more problems in the future. The chairman of the 
market, who is also the former chair of Zomba Street Vendors Association, argues that those operating 
inside the market created this problem. According to the chairman, when the street vendors were being 
demarcated space in the flea market, some of them used their family relations to have more spaces 
than required. They were claiming more space with the prospect of renting out the rest to others. This 
led to a situation whereby the market was wrongly declared to be full when in actual fact there was still 
some room. In this case the remaining vendors who did not have space were allowed to operate outside 
on condition that they stick to the areas close to the flea market.  
Growth limitation and other problems due to poor design of the markets 
Most vendors complained that the new vendors market was poorly designed. The old Zomba market is 
wire fenced so that people outside can easily see some of the commodities being displayed inside. 
However, the flea market has a very high brick wall. The vendors complain that the war psychologically 
affects them because it is like being in a prison. One man selling plastic items mentioned “ I really 
wonder why they decided to have this market with such a very high brick wall, are we in prison?” He 
continued to mention that outside the market he usually meets some of his former customers but they 
refuse to come to this flea market. Some of the reasons given are that the market seems to be too odd. 
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The space in the market is too small and it assumes that the vendors are not capable of expanding their 
businesses. Each vendor was allocated only one square meter of space to ply his or her trade. One lady 
who sells second-hand clothes complained that: 
Outside I had a lot of space but here I was only given one square meter. What viable business can you 
undertake with such a limited space. Being a street vendor doesn’t mean that you lack innovation for 
growth.   
Those relocated to Matawale market complain that their new market is not worthy to be called a market 
at all. The Matawale market is located on an area that used to be an open ground. It literally had no 
structure. Two toilets were built while the vendors were already on the site. According to one of the 
vendors, “our relocation was hastily done without full preparation on where they were going to place us, 
imagine where we are now? Why should we be paying tax here when there is no proper services?” he 
asked.  Due  to  financial  constraints  the  local  assembly  official  mentioned  that  they  are  unlikely  to 
construct  the  market  at  Matawale  soon.  Undoubtedly  street  vendors  are  wrongly  believed  to  be 
contentious  “because city planners have left them with no other viable place to go” (Cross, 2000, 
emphasis added). 
Loss of trust with the government  
The  vendors  also  indicated  that  they  no  longer  trust  the  present  government  and  its  so-called 
democratic principles. The majority complained that the president rules the country like the former 
dictator Kamuzu Banda. One man selling tomatoes at Matawale market complained that “we vendors 
are no threat to any one, why are they treating us like this when all we want is to earn a living which 
they are denying us; are we criminals?”. He continued to argue that the government should create jobs 
for them or else leave them to operate freely. Another woman selling fruits at the same Matawale 
market questioned the virtues of democracy as seemingly advocated by the ruling party when she said  
“Is this what it means to be in a democratic country?” 
The vendors indicated that as long as the present government was in control it is almost impossible for 
them to come back to the streets. They believe that the government is strongly against them because 
the majority of the vendors support the former president and his UDF party.  They indicated that they 
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Upsrge of theft and robbery cases 
Although not fully substantiated by data the vendors interviewed stated that some of their colleagues 
had mentioned that they would resort to criminal activities such as theft and robbery in order to ensure 
that they survive. The ordinary citizens of Zomba who were randomly interviewed also mentioned that 
the rise in criminal activity in the city was mainly due to the removal of the vendors from the streets. A 
few months after the vendors were evicted, several cases of theft, robbery and burglary occurred in the 
city of Zomba. For example four Watchmen at Mulunguzi Secondary School were brutally murdered by 
robbers. It was also reported that some robbers who attacked a household in Matawale Township said 
that they had no alternative since their livelihood had been taken away. 
8. Conclusion 
The paper notes that the vendors have not yet developed viable alternatives for their survival. Their 
businesses are either regressing or being abandoned. They have no hope of returning to the streets 
where they used to make a lot of money. Probably the government’s major challenge was how to 
control street vending so that it shouldn’t negatively affect the development of its urban centers. By 
trying  to  formalize  the  sector  through  provision  of  a  formal  markets  (the  flea  markets),  loans  and 
registration,  the  government  is  “potentially  undermine  the  very  factors  that  make  many  informal 
enterprises  successful”  because  “where  street  markets  have  become  vibrant  sources  of  economic 
growth, it is due to the fact that they have been able to avoid rigid regulatory control and regulate 
themselves” (Cross, 2000). Cross’s observation seems a plausible solution for Malawi’s vendors when 
he states that letting the sector “to remain largely informal within certain broad guidelines (and making 
sure that broad public health concerns are met)” ultimately “would allow at least some informal firms to 
naturally grow until the point at which it makes more sense to become formal in order to protect their 
capital and resources”. 
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